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Globalization for Whom?
Mark Weisbrot*
Introduction
At the height of the debate over "fast-track" authority last November, Presi-
dent Clinton summed up his sentiment with this statement: "I wish we
could have a secret vote in the Congress," he said, "we'd pass it three or
four to one."1
Prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Pres-
ident would have had his wish. International trade and commercial agree-
ments received scant public attention and were relegated to obscure articles
buried deep in the business section of the newspaper. The public contro-
versy over NAFTA six years ago changed all that and initiated a process of
democratization of U.S. foreign economic policy. The recent debate over
"fast-track" exemplifies the progress of this democratization since the pre-
NAFTA days. Furthermore, the fact that the House of Representatives,
despite enormous lobbying from business interests, was unwilling to grant
the President "fast-track" authority to negotiate new trade and commercial
agreements - that is, subject only to an up or down vote by Congress -
indicates the widespread public perception that such agreements are not in
their interest.
Since May of 1995, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has been quietly negotiating the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI).2 This wide-sweeping agreement among twenty-
nine developed nations sought to codify the liberalization of international
investment, much as NAFTA had done for North America. 3 Initially, the
MAI was scheduled to be completed by April of 1997. Grassroots opposi-
tion from environmental and citizens organizations throughout the OECD
countries - especially the United States, Canada, and France - had pre-
* Research Director, Preamble Center, Washington, D.C.
1. Clinton, House GOP Leaders Push for 'Fast Track' Support, WASH. PoSr, Nov. 7,
1997, at A20.
2. See generally Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Multilateral Agreement
on Investment: The MAI Negotiating Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text].
3. Although NAFTA was presented to the public as a trade agreement, the five chap-
ters dealing with the liberalization of investment are arguably of much greater impact,
especially since U.S. trade barriers were already quite low, and the potential for
expanding the Mexican market for U.S. goods is not all that large. What U.S. corpora-
tions wanted most, and got from NAFTA, was a set of rules that made it easier, safer, and
more profitable to invest in Mexico.
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vented this scheduled completion.4
The Asian economic crisis also threw a wrench into the machinery of
financial liberalization. The crisis opened a whole new debate over how to
protect national economies from the instability caused by international
capital flows. Even more importantly, the crisis has caused people to ques-
tion the role of globalizing institutions, such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), in dealing with international economic problems. In short,
the crisis initiated a broadening in the debate over global trade and capital
flows.
The level of this debate has been uneven. The general public has been
the most active participant of the debate. The populace has always been
open to considering questions about who benefits and who loses from
globalization. Among popular audiences, it has never been off limits to
suggest that the process of globalization should be slowed, halted, or
reversed. The general public will not embrace globalization until its costs
and benefits might be more equitably distributed, or until it can be made
compatible with core public values on such issues as democracy, national
sovereignty, labor rights, or the environment. Organized public interest
groups have been the most dynamic; for example, even though most of the
major U.S. environmental groups initially supported NAFTA, the same
organizations opposed both fast-track and the MAI a few years later.
Among circles of elite opinion, the debate remains much more sub-
dued. Nevertheless, there are significant openings. Although most econo-
mists continue to view liberalization of trade and investment flows as
representing beneficial progress, some important research and writings,
however, have begun to acknowledge some of the problems associated with
liberalization. For example, Dani Rodrik's book, published by the
staunchly pro-globalization Institute for International Economics, was the
first work of its kind to focus on the damage inflicted by global economic
integration on broad sectors of the labor force.5 Rodrik acknowledged that
the increased international mobility of firms has made it more difficult for
governments to pursue policies that raise the cost of labor or to sustain a
social safety net for the labor force.
In a study that was also published by the Institute for International
Economics, William Cline concludes that part of the increase in wage ine-
quality over the last twenty years has resulted from trade.6 It should be
noted that this wide gap in income distribution was caused by regular trad-
ing. It does not include the downward pressure on wages that results from
employers' increasing ability to move production to other countries. Jeffrey
Sachs of the Harvard Institute of International Development concluded
that "the IMF medicine seems to be adding to the financial panic." 7 Sachs'
4. See, e.g., The Sinking of the MAI, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at 81; Guy de
Jonquieres, Network Guerillas, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at 20; Madeleine Drohan, How
the Net Killed the MAI, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 29, 1998, at Al.
5. DAI RODRiK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 69-85 (1997).
6. WILLIAM I CLINE, TRADE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 257-63 (1996).
7. Jeffrey Sachs, Fixing the IMF Remedy, THE BANKER, Feb. 1998, at 17.
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research, with Steven Radelet, on the Asian financial crisis similarly docu-
ments how international financial liberalization created the conditions for
the crisis.8
Within policy making circles, there has been much less debate. The
executive branch remains committed to "full speed ahead." While they are
constrained by popular opinion, government officials have made no con-
cessions to opponents of liberalization in their description, analysis, and
vision of the world. For them, removal of barriers to international invest-
ment and trade remains a positive step forward.
The media generally agrees with this position. While it has reported
the views of those who oppose fast-track or other pro-globalization initia-
tives, mainstream journalism has yet to report the serious debates within
the economics profession. Some of this complacency is due to the unique
and partly coincidental historical conjuncture that appears, in the eyes of
the media, to lend support to the advocates of global deregulation. The
Japanese economy, once looked upon as a model of successful industrial
policy, has been in a slump for more than six years. Advocates of liberali-
zation interpret this slump as a failure of the entire Japanese model, which
therefore needs to be scrapped in favor of a more open and competitive
industrial and financial structure. The European Union is viewed in simi-
lar terms. Its double-digit unemployment rates are attributed to its attempt
to maintain inflexible labor market policies in the face of growing global
competition. With the U.S. economy at 4.5% unemployment, it is easy for
journalists to conclude that the American model, and indeed a much more
globalized and idealized form of it, is the only viable alternative to eco-
nomic stagnation.
In reality, European unemployment rates are attributed to the tight
monetary policies that have been adopted in recent years. Prior to this
tightening, the difference between European and American labor market
flexibility was actually much greater, but the European unemployment rate
was lower. For instance, Sweden had an unemployment rate of 1.8% as
recently as 1990. Likewise, it is difficult to blame Japan's slump on the
industrial policy that gave it one of the highest growth rates in the world
during most of the post-war period. And the United States' apparent suc-
cess is largely a cyclical phenomenon: by most measures of economic per-
formance (e.g., capital formation, productivity growth, wage growth) the
current economic expansion still compares poorly with previous business
cycle upswings. In any case, there is little empirical or theoretical basis for
the simplistic notion that increasing liberalization of international trade
commerce is the solution, without regard to the specifics of the economic
institutions of particular countries.
The continued blind adherence to the neoliberal paradigm and its
enforcement through the expanding scope of international agreements
such as the MAI poses a threat to democratic reform generally. South
8. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, Asia's Reemergence, FOREIGN An'., Nov./Dec.
1997, at 44.
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Korea, for example, had its first democratic election at the end of last year,
and the suffering brought on by IMF's austere reform package will likely
induce some nostalgia for past years of dictatorship.
Disillusionment with democracy is also prevalent in Latin America,
one of the more structurally adjusted regions in the world.9 Since the IMF
and the World Bank began structural adjustment programs in Latin
America in the early 1980s, the whole region has had a per capita growth
rate of about zero. In Mexico, most of the population had been better off
economically under an authoritarian regime. Mexican economic growth
prior to international trade and investment liberalization was fairly rapid,
at a real per capita rate of 3.9% in the 1960s and 3.2% in the 1970s. Since
the beginning of the 1980s, when liberalization began, per capita income
has stagnated and real wages have actually fallen. 10 People's attitudes
towards democracy are easily poisoned when its introduction coincides
with economic stagnation. It is a tragic irony that Latin America achieved
formal democratic governance at a time when global economic institutions
amd their austere reform packages have so severely restricted the choices
available to democratically elected governments.
Global economic institutions are not solely responsible for limiting the
range of economic choices. There has also been a great deal of change in
economic theory. In the 1950s, economists recognized that "late industri-
alization" required greater protection and state intervention than what
developed countries had relied upon during their early development."
The discipline of development economics was founded on the premise that
the problems of underdeveloped countries were fundamentally different
from those of the rich countries and that the poor countries required differ-
ent tools of analysis as well as policy prescriptions.
Today's economists no longer recognize this version of development
economics. It has been replaced by what Albert Hirschman has called
"monoeconomics": the belief that there are universal laws of economics
that apply to all economies, and economic policy-making is overwhelm-
ingly a matter of conforming to these laws.12 Today, monoeconomics
translates into following the dictates of the global economy.
The MAI and the programs of the IMF and the World Bank are mani-
festations of the adoption of monoeconomics.
Advocates of monoeconomics believe that governmental interference
in the economy will only lead to harmful distortions in the marketplace.
Neoclassical economists, such as Rodrik, subscribe to such libertarian
9. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Venezuelans Confronting Democracy's Dire State,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at A3. The article cites "the end of Government price sup-
ports" - a condition enforced by an IMF agreement - as well as the fact that "70 to 80
percent of the population [is] in poverty" as part of the reason for disillusionment. Id.
10. ANGUS MADDISON, MONITORING THE WORLD ECONOMY 1820-1992, at 78-79
(1995).
11. See, e.g., ALEXANOER GERSHENKRON, ECONOMIC BAcKWARDNFss IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTiVE 52-71 (1962).
12. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, ESSAYS IN TRESPASSING: ECONOMICS TO POLITICS AND BEYOND 3
(1981).
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views. According to Rodrik,13 "the danger is that the domestic consensus
in favor of open markets will ultimately erode to the point where a genera-
lized resurgence of protectionism becomes a serious possibility."' 4
But this domestic consensus is an agreement among the elite and does
not extend to the general population, which has borne the costs of global-
ization. When Harvard economist Robert Lawrence stated that we cannot
pay $10 an hour for "unskilled" labor in a global economy,' 5 the public
has good reason to question this reasoning. After all, we were able to afford
these wages, in real terms, thirty years ago. Productivity has in fact
increased more than fifty percent over the last three decades. 16 It is worth
emphasizing that the most common definition of "unskilled" labor used by
economists includes anyone without a college degree, which is more than
seventy percent of the labor force.17 Does our current participation in the
global economy require declining wages for the majority of workers in the
face of rising productivity? If this is true, then the logical response is not to
accept this requirement as inevitable, but to re-examine our participation
in the global economy.
I. Socioeconomic Impacts of Globalization
A. The Age of Globalization as Compared to the Bretton Woods Era
If we divide the post-World War II era into two periods - from 1946 to
1973 and from 1973 to the present - there is a clear decline in the material
well-being for the majority of Americans. The first period, often called the
"Bretton Woods era," was a time of rapid income growth. The real wages of
a typical American employee increased by more than eighty percent during
this period. Since 1973, by contrast, real wages have declined.' 8
Since 1973, the rate of unemployment has increased. Significant
increases in temporary and contingent employment and an increase in
overall job insecurity characterize the present era. The lifetime employ-
ment once offered by companies like IBM and General Motors has pretty
much disappeared. In 1996, a survey of workers at large firms found "that
46 percent were fearful of a job layoff."19 From 1979-1990, no more than
13. As Jeff Faux has noted, "faith" is the best word to describe Rodrik's (and other
economists') attachment to the principles of free trade; when economists actually try to
measure the gains from trade, they turn out to be very small. Rodrik concedes as much:
"For example, no widely accepted model attributes to postwar trade liberalization more
than a yery tiny fraction of the increased prosperity of the advanced industrial countries.
Yet most economists do believe that expanding trade was very important to this pro-
gress." Jeff Faux, Hedging the Neoliberal Bet, DissENT, Fall 1997, at 119-21.
14. RODRIK, supra note 5, at 6.
15. Robert Lawrence, In the Best of Both Worlds Consider a Third Option, WASH. POST,
June 23, 1997, at A12.
16. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvISERS, EcoNoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 338 (1998).
17. Another commonly used definition is production and non-supervisory workers,
which is about 80% of the labor force.
18. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERIcAN 41-97 (1997).
19. Monetary Policy Report to Congress: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, 150th Cong. 36 (1997) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
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twenty-four percent answered yes; by 1995 and 1996 that number reached
forty-six percent.20
Poverty and income inequality have also increased in recent years.
The reversal of the gains from the War on Poverty is most strikingly
revealed in the poverty rate for children. In 1960, this rate was twenty-
seven percent, but by 1973, it had fallen to fourteen percent. By 1993, it
was back up to twenty-three percent.21 The post-War progress in combat-
ting income inequality has ceased. The ratio of family income for the top
to the bottom quintile of families declined from almost nine to one in 1947
to seven to one in 1973.22 It has now soared to eleven to one.23 Almost all
of the income gains from economic growth in the last decade have accrued
to the top five percent of American families.24
These downward trends have not reversed in the course of the current
economic recovery. The fact that most Americans cannot count on making
real income gains during an economic expansion is probably one of the
defining characteristics of the present era. The old saying, "a rising tide
lifts all boats," which described the economy of the Bretton Woods era, no
longer holds true. The U.S. economy is now entering its eighth year of
economic expansion, which is long by any historical measure, and the
majority of American employees have still not reached their pre-recession
(1989) level of real wages. 25
This lack of progress coincides with increasing globalization of the
American economy. The share of imports in manufacturing ha more than
doubled in the past twenty-five years.26 Financial capital has become
extremely mobile, with daily currency transactions rising from a mere $80
billion in 1980 to $1.26 trillion in 1995. In proportion to world trade,
trade in foreign exchange rose from a ratio of 10:1 to nearly 70:1.27 For-
eign direct investment (FDI) has also taken off. During the eight years fol-
lowing the world recession of 1982, FDI increased by thirty-five percent per
year.28 As a percentage of the world's gross fixed capital formation, FDI
has nearly doubled since the beginning of the 1980s. 29
20. Id.
21. Robert Z. Lawrence, Current Economic Policies: Social Implications Over the
Longer Term, in SOCIETAL COHESION AND THE GLOBALISING ECONOMICS 29 (1997).
22. GARY BuRTLEss Er AL., GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 3
(1998).
23. Id.
24. Richard B. Freeman, Solving the New Inequality, BOSTON REV., Dec./Jan. 1996-97,
at 3.
25. This is in spite of the fact that median real wages have actually risen for 1996
and 1997 at an average annual rate of 2.6%. It remains to be seen whether this recent
trend can be sustained; clearly it has much to do with the relatively low levels of unem-
ployment that have been sustained for the last few years. See generally MISEL ET AL.,
supra note 18.
26. Id. at 192.
27. JOHN EATWELL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL L1BERAuSATIoN: THE RECORD 1 (1996).
28. PETER NUNNENKAMP Er AL., GLOBALISATION OF PRODUCTION AND MARKETS 6-7
(1994).
29. EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL COPOR.ATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 1
(1996).
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While the focus here is on the United States, it is worth noting that the
same is true for most of the rest of the world. The majority of European
workers have suffered reduced wage growth and, in recent decades, high
unemployment. For most of the less developed countries, the post-Bretton
Woods era 'has been a disaster. Africa has fared the worst, with an actual
decline in average income per person - not just the income of the majority
- over the last two decades. Latin America has had about zero per capita
income growth since 1980. The exceptions to the general trend have been
those Asian countries (e.g., China, South Korea, Taiwan) that were able,
through considerable regulation, to participate in the global economy with-
out sacrificing the needs of their domestic economies.
Advocates of trade and investment liberalization do not deny the
decline in economic performance during the post-Bretton Woods era. For
them, the question is one of cause and effect: how much, if any, has the
increase in globalization contributed to these problems? If it has, how has
this happened, and what should be done about it?
B. Globalization and Living Standards
Economists who support liberalization have recently begun to concede that
large numbers of workers have been harmed by the process. They argue,
however, that these effects are small relative to the actual and potential
gains. For example, the OECD has just issued a pro-liberalization report
describing the negative impacts as "modest."30 Citing the low end of the
range of estimates for the effect of trade, the OECD attributed about ten to
twenty percent of the change in wage and income distribution in the devel-
oped countries to trade with developing countries.31 Leaving aside the fact
that other estimates are much higher,32 how is one to assess the impor-
tance of this impact? No one disputes that the impact of trade on wage
inequality is statistically significant. The question is whether, from a pol-
icy point of view, this impact should be considered large or small.
In measuring the impact of trade liberalization, there is an obvious
standard of comparison: the efficiency gains that are claimed as an
achievement of trade liberalization. William Cline estimates the annual
efficiency gains to the U.S. economy from the Uruguay Round of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to be $450 million.33 If we
multiply this figure by 1.5 to account for the growth of trade since 1990, we
get $675 million.
How do these gains compare to the losses suffered by workers who
have been negatively impacted by trade and investment liberalization? Real
average hourly earnings in the United States fell from $12.72 an hour in
30. ORGANISATION FOR EcoNoMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OPEN MARKETS
MATTER: THE BENEFITS OF TRADE AND INvasmaT LIBERALISATION 11 (1998).
31. Id. at 67.
32. See, e.g., CLINE, supra note 6.
33. William R. Cline, Evaluating the Uruguay Round, WORLD ECON., Jan. 1995, at 1-
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1973 to $11.46 an hour in 1995. 34 From 1989 to 1995, there was a 3.4%
drop, from $11.87 to $11.46.
These figures are for production and non-supervisory employees, who
comprise about eighty percent of the workforce. Applying the forty-one
cents an hour reduction for the years 1989-95 to 1995 wages, the result is
about $82 billion in lost wages. Even if we were to accept that "only 10-
20%" of these lost wages are due to trade liberalization, the loss is still
approximately $8.2-16.4 billion for 1995. That amount is twelve to twenty-
four times the efficiency gains from trade that accrued to the entire popula-
tion, not just these workers.35 As illustrated by this comparison, the losses
that most workers suffer from liberalized trade cannot be considered "mod-
est" or small, unless we dismiss the gains from trade as completely trivial.
It should not be surprising that most workers would lose more from
the downward pressure on wages due to globalization than what they could
hope to gain from cheaper goods resulting from liberalized trade. The real
wage is a statistic that takes into account both of these effects. Because real
wages for the majority of U.S. workers have fallen since 1973 (i.e., during
the post-Bretton Woods era of increasing globalization), there is a strong
prima facie case that, at least for the majority, the costs of globalization
have exceeded the benefits.
The relationship between globalization and declining wages is com-
plex and cannot be fully captured in standard economic measures, such as
the effective increase in labor supply due to increasing trade. This is evi-
dent if we consider some of the ways in which fundamental economic
arrangements have changed since the end of the Bretton Woods era. Since
1973, union membership has fallen from twgnty-four percent to about
fourteen percent of the labor force. The accord that previously existed
between capital and labor has broken down: employers have resorted to
previously proscribed tactics such as permanently replacing striking work-
ers, and the legal obligation of employers under the 1935 Wagner Act to
bargain in good faith with a recognized union has been rendered practi-
cally meaningless. Industries in the transportation and communications
sectors have been deregulated. Perhaps most importantly, there has been a
drastic change in monetary policy, especially since 1979, that has favored
higher unemployment and slower or zero real wage growth.
How much has globalization had to do with these changes? The most
straightforward and obvious connection has manifested itself in the loss of
unionized jobs, particularly in manufacturing. Recent estimates show that
the increase in trade between 1979-1990 caused a net loss of 2.4 million
jobs, as compared to a baseline scenario in which trade remained at the
same percentage of the economy. 3 6 Increased trade has probably been the
34. In 1995 dollars. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 18.
35. This approximation is for 1995. Earlier years in the 1989-95 period will show
smaller losses, and the average year would be about half of this $8.2-16.4 billion. The
lost wages would still be many times the estimated gains from freer trade.
36. ROBERT E. SCOTT Er AL., ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, TRADING AWAY GOOD JOBS:
AN EXAMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE U.S., 1979-1994, at 1-11 (1997).
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largest contributor to the decline in union membership over the last
twenty-five years.
As union membership dwindled, workers found it more difficult to
stem the erosion of their legal rights. Even under a Democratic President
and with a Democratic majority in Congress (1992-94), there were few
reversals of the legal and institutional changes that began with President
Reagan's mass firing of striking air traffic controllers in 1981.
Given that liberalization has made it easier for employers to move the
production process to countries with lower wage rates, liberalization has
increased the employer's bargaining power vis-a-vis the workers. This
increase in bargaining power has kept wages low. In a study commis-
sioned by the labor secretariat of NAFTA, Kate Bronfenbrenner surveyed
firms that faced union organizing drives since the agreement was passed.
She found that the majority of these firms threatened to shut down opera-
tions if the union won. Fifteen percent of the firms actually did close all or
part of a plant when they had to bargain with a union - this is three times
the pre-NAFTA rate of such incidents.37
Such statistics accord with the result of a Wall Street Journal survey
taken prior to NAFTA in which executives of major U.S. corporations were
polled on what they would do if NAFTA were to pass. Forty percent said it
was likely that they would move at least some production to Mexico, and
twenty-four percent said they would use the threat of moving as a bargain-
ing chip to keep U.S. wages down.38
This survey data is not easily quantifiable as a percentage of workers'
real wage declines, but it is clearly a significant and understated part of the
story. The fact that the MAI, like NAFTA, contains provisions that benefit
foreign investors without any protection for domestic labor is seen by crit-
ics as a signal that the agreement will likely accelerate present trends.
Put most simply, globalization severs the link between productivity
and wage growth for the majority of the work force. Thus, while the major-
ity of employees were able to share in the productivity gains during the
Bretton Woods era, this is no longer true.
One could fairly expect that the increasing mobility and consequent
bargaining power of capital, along with the corresponding weakening of
labor, would not only increase wage inequality but also alter the distribu-
tion of income between capital and labor. This apparently has happened.
In the United States, the share of national income that goes to corporate
profits has increased by 3.2% since the last business cycle peak in 1989.39
Although this may not seem like a large number, it actually represents a
significant redivision of the economic pie. But for this shift, the median
37. KATE BRONFENBRENNER, NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION,
FINAL REPORT, THE EFFEcTs OF PLANT CLOSING OR THREAT OF PLANT CLOSING ON THE RIGHT
OF WORKERS TO ORGANIZE 1-35 (1996).
38. Bob Davis, One America, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at R1.
39. U.S. Dep't of Com., National Income and Product Accounts tbl.A (1997) (unpub-
lished report, Economic Policy Institute).
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wage earner would be making about $1100 more per year than what he or
she is presently earning.
In Europe, the redistribution of income from labor to capital has, over
a longer period, been considerably greater than in the United States. For
countries in the European Union, the share of capital income in the busi-
ness sector was 5.5 percentage points higher in 1997 than the average
share from 1970 to 1980.40
On the other hand, the United States, which has gone further and
faster down the path of regressive globalization than OECD Europe, has
become a low-wage country among the more developed nations. If we look
at hourly compensation costs in manufacturing for the fifteen countries
with the highest income, the United States is basically tied with Italy for
third from the bottom.4 1
While conventional wisdom says that the lowering of wages has
benefitted U.S. employees by creating jobs, this argument rests on a fallacy
of composition. The argument confuses the operation of economic forces
at the micro level (i.e., the level of the individual firm or industry) and the
macro level (i.e., economy-wide). Within the context of an individual firm,
it is indeed possible, and even likely, that the number of employees hired
would fall as wages rise and rise as wages fall. However, at the economy-
wide level, we would expect no such relationship, and in fact none is
observed empirically in studies that looked at increases in the minimum
wage.42 Such disparity is due to the fact that the economy-wide level of
employment is primarily determined by the amount of aggregate demand
in the economy rather than by wages. As wages rise, firms substitute capi-
tal for labor, but there is no reason for this to increase the unemployment
rate in the economy, so long as there is enough demand for the goods and
services for those who want to work and are capable of producing.
This generalization, of course, has limited efficacy, especially in the
short run. If the minimum wage, for example, was doubled overnight,
some unemployment would result. But there is no reason to expect a simi-
lar result from less dramatic wage growth, even if the end result is very
high. The composition of jobs would change as wage levels increased - in
the United States, for example, we could expect fewer jobs in the fast food
industry. In general, there would be a relative decline in the number of
very low productivity jobs. These would be replaced, however, with newly
created, higher-productivity and higher-paying jobs.
40. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OUTLOOK 62, at
A27 (1997). European workers, unlike their American counterparts, have not suffered
an absolute decline in their real wages during the post-Bretton Woods era. This was
possible in spite of the much greater shift of income shares (as compared to the United
States) from labor to capital in Europe because of higher productivity growth rates in
Europe.
41. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., FOREIGN LABOR STATISTICS 28 (1998). Data is for 1996, the
most recent year available.
42. See, e.g., DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYni AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEw
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 1 passim (1995); MISHEL ET AL., supra note 18.
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Instituting a low-wage economy could actually slow economic growth
and overall income growth by slowing the rate of productivity growth. If
we compare OECD Europe with the United States, we find that productiv-
ity, since 1979, has grown at an annual rate of about two percent in
Europe, as opposed to one percent in the United States. The lower U.S.
wage levels, especially at the lower deciles of the wage ladder, have likely
been responsible for much of the difference in productivity growth. These
low wage levels encourage the creation of low-productivity jobs and dis-
courage investment in new capital and technology that would boost the
rate of productivity growth.
C. Globalization and Monetary Policy
Most people are unaware of the tremendous impact that monetary policy -
the setting of interest rates by the central bank - has on economic growth,
employment, wages, and income distribution. In the United States, a com-
mittee of the Federal Reserve meets every six weeks to set short-term inter-
est rates. The Federal Reserve is able to slow economic growth by raising
interest rates. The unemployment created by the raised interest rates in
turn exerts a downward pressure on wage growth.
The Federal Reserve faces a trade-off in determining its monetary pol-
icy. If the economy grows too fast, there is a likelihood of inflation. On
the other hand, if it focuses on keeping inflation down, the Federal Reserve
will then retard economic growth and create higher unemployment. The
Federal Reserve is supposed to balance these two conflicting goals to main-
tain the highest levels of economic growth.
Since the late 1970s, however, the Federal Reserve has been almost
exclusively concerned with inflation. As a result, the United States has had
much higher unemployment and slower growth than it experienced during
the Bretton Woods era. This focus on inflation is partly a result of ideolog-
ical changes in economic theory, but it is also very much an issue of polit-
ical power. Large bondholders and financiers in general, prefer a tight
monetary policy (i.e., higher interest rates). Any increase in inflation, or
even the threat of an increase, erodes the value of their bonds. By contrast,
the majority of people would be better off with an extra percentage point of
inflation if it meant higher real wages and more available jobs.
During the Bretton Woods era, the interests of bondholders were
counteracted by those of large domestic manufacturers, who had a stake in
a growing U.S. economy and the demand that it generated for their prod-
ucts. Their influence, together with that of organized labor, was enough to
ensure a monetary policy that resulted in relatively higher levels of
employment.
In the present period, the tight monetary policy prevails because
financial capital trumps manufacturing interests, and labor has very little
influence at all. Globalization has played a major role in bringing us to this
state of affairs, especially through the hollowing out of our manufacturing
base and the weakening of unions. Extending the process of international
economic integration through agreements such as the MAI will further con-
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solidate the financier's grip on monetary policy, thereby making the pur-
suit of full employment increasingly difficult in the future.
Globalization increases the power of transnational corporations rela-
tive to domestic firms, which have more of an interest in a growing national
economy. This conflict can be seen, for example, in the consistent opposi-
tion by the National Association of Manufacturers, an otherwise conserva-
tive business group, to unnecessary interest rate hikes by the Federal
Reserve.43 Today, the combination of international financiers and transna-
tional corporations is strong enough to prevent a return to the expansion-
ary monetary polices of the Bretton Woods era. 44
Transnational corporations have an interest in a higher international
value of the dollar because this allows them to buy assets and labor more
cheaply overseas. However, a higher dollar value erodes our manufactur-
ing base and increases our trade deficit by rhaking U.S. imports cheaper
and exports more expensive abroad.
Globalization also discourages the use of expansionary fiscal policy,
that is, a deliberate increase in government spending in order to stimulate
the economy when needed, such as during a recession. As the U.S. econ-
omy becomes more globalized, the feasibility and effectiveness of expansio-
nary monetary and fiscal policies are reduced. The United States is still in
the enviable position of being able to pursue full employment policies with-
out having to worry about the inflationary consequences brought on by an
international response to such action. An expansionary monetary or fiscal
policy tends to cause depreciation of the domestic currency, which
increases the price of imports. For most countries, especially in Europe,
the resultant inflation can be prohibitive. Presently, our imports are still
less than fourteen percent of our GDP, so we have little to fear from a drop
in the value of the dollar. As the share of trade in our economy increases,
however, it will become more difficult for the United States to pursue an
expansionary monetary policy. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is also
reduced as imports grow.
The role of globalization in consolidating the power of international
financial interests, and their ability to exercise a veto over expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, is probably one of the most important effects.
The expectations of financial markets tend to be self-fulfilling. If bond-
holders believe that increased deficit spending causes interest rates to rise,
43. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, Federal Reserve Lifts a Key Rate; First Rise Since
'95, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1997, at Al.
44. In 1998, the Federal Reserve has allowed the unemployment rate to remain
below five percent, without raising interest rates. The Federal Reserve last raised rates in
March 1997 and was criticized for doing so because there was no evidence of rising
inflation. A combination of factors, including falling inflation and the Asian financial
crisis, have kept the Federal Reserve holding nominal interest rates steady since then. It
remains to be seen to what degree this represents a long-term policy change; prior to
mid-1994 the Federal Reserve operated under the theory, supported by most econo-
mists, that unemployment could not drop below six percent without causing inflation to
accelerate. See id.
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this will in fact happen, even if there is no economic basis for their belief.45
This occurs simply because their selling of bonds in response to an
increase in government spending will push up long-term interest rates. By
increasing the power of these financial interests, globalization undermines
the ability of governments throughout the world to engage in social spend-
ing for the public interest.
In all of these ways and more, globalization strengthens the forces and
tendencies that favor slower growth, higher unemployment, and lower
wages. In sum, globalization serves the interests of international finan-
ciers, whose agenda may be more powerful than those of trade and invest-
ment flows. These effects are difficult to measure, but they are no less real
than the resulting plant closures and direct job losses due to import
competition.
II. International Legislation of Globalization
It is undisputed that the MAI is intended to facilitate the process of global-
ization. The controversy concerns whether the kind of globalization it pro-
motes will benefit broad sectors of the population or whether it will
exacerbate the problems that critics have attributed to the the past twenty-
five years of global economic integration.
There are a number of provisions that would support the latter prog-
nosis. First, the rule on national treatment requires that foreign investors
and investments be treated no less favorably than domestic ones. Many
national, state, and local initiatives that promote employment, local invest-
ment, and industrial policies would have a differential impact on foreign-
owned firms, and thus these could be prevented by the national treatment
requirement. For example, the direction of state pension funds to invest in
local businesses, as part of a local economic development plan, could run
afoul of the agreement's national treatment provisions.
For less developed countries, these provisions would preclude many of
the development strategies that were most successful in the past. For
example, most of the policies that were essential to South Korea's growth
and development would be prohibited by the national treatment provisions
of the MAI. 4 6 The Korean government intervened heavily to promote
targeted industries such as cement, fertilizer, petroleum refining, steel,
chemicals, as well as capital and durable consumer goods. This was done
through subsidized credit, tax, tariffs, exemptions, export subsidies, and.
the creation of protected monopolies. Foreign direct investment was
restricted, and it played only a minimal role in South Korea's industrializa-
tion and development.47
45. See EATwELL, supra note 27.
46. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 2, art. III (National Treatment and Most
Favored Nation Treatment).
47. See, e.g., Larry Westphal, Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Les-
sons from South Korea's Experience, 4 J. EcoN. PERsP. 41, 47 (1990).
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The MAI would also limit performance requirements that require
firms to comply with certain conditions in order to operate in a particular
country or municipality. 4 8 Requirements that foreign firms hire a certain
percentage of local residents or use domestically or locally produced
inputs could be prohibited under the MAI.
Opponents are also concerned about a proposed provision for resolv-
ing disputes between investors and national governments. This provision
would give private investors and corporations the right to sue national gov-
ernments for monetary damages. This is a powerful tool for intimidating
governments into not passing environmental regulations that a particular
company might not like, and it could also prevent governments from
undertaking a variety of regulatory measures that are aimed at serving
public interests. Currently, under agreements such as the GATT, a corpo-
ration may not directly sue a foreign government but rather must ask its
own government to pursue the complaint.
To illustrate the significance of this change, consider the following
example. Last year, the Canadian government prohibited the import of
MMT, a gasoline additive that is effectively banned in the United States. It
was banned on the ground that it was a potential health hazard. The pro-
ducer of the additive, the American-based Ethyl corporation, sued the
Canadian government for $251 million in damages. Ethyl's argument was
that the Canadian government's ruling discriminates against Ethyl, and
they sued under the provisions of NAFTA that provide for equal treatment
of foreign and domestic investors.
On July 20, 1998, the Canadian government dropped its ban on MMT
and agreed to pay Ethyl US$13 million, in Canadian currency, for legal
costs and lost profits.4 9 While there might be legitimate disagreements
over the scientific evidence regarding the additive's threat to public health,
there is little doubt that the Canadian government banned this substance
for public health reasons. There is no evidence that it was done in order to
benefit Canadian firms at the expense of Ethyl or any other foreign firm.
The question is whether the judgment of elected or appointed officials
entrusted with protecting public health or the environment in such matters
should be overturned by international agreements designed to protect cor-
porate interests.
The idea that no nation may legally distinguish between foreign and
domestic investors is the guiding principle of the MAI. As a result, it would
make it more difficult for state and local governments in the United States,
for example, to support local economic development based on local busi-
nesses. Municipal governments would not even be able to defend them-
selves if sued by a foreign corporation. Instead, they would have to rely on
the federal government, which may be unsympathetic to their aims, to
defend them in an unaccountable international tribunal.
48. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 2, art. III (Performance Requirements).
49. Laura Eggertson, Liberals Lift Ban on Controversial Gas Additive, ToRoNro STAR,
July 21, 1998, at A7.
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Among the opponents' primary concerns are that these and other pro-
visions establish new rights for corporations without any corresponding
rights for labor or the public and limit the ability of governments to carry
out policies to promote employment and local, or even national, economic
development. The opponents argue that this is exactly the kind of global-
ization that has contributed to increases in poverty and income inequality
over the last two decades.
III. Financial Problems of Globalization
A. Destabilizing Capital Flows: The Asian Financial Crisis
Prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis one year ago, there were few
mainstream challenges to the globalizer's maxim that the liberalization of
international capital flows was in everyone's best interests. This principle
seemed almost as well established as the theory of comparative advantage
with regard to trade and was able to benefit from a sort of "proof by associ-
ation" with the latter, even though trade theory does not apply to capital
flows. 50 In addition, the theory of comparative advantage has limited use-
fulness to any kind of economic development strategy.
The cause of liberalizing international investment received its most
serious blow when the economies of South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, the Philippines, and others in the region were hit by a financial
crisis that quickly developed into a regional depression. Although the poli-
cies of the IMF helped to transform the financial crisis into a crisis of the
underlying real economy, it is also now clear that the financial liberaliza-
tion of these countries was a major proximate cause, if not the major cause,
of the crisis. Jagdish Bhagwhati, one of the world's leading international
economists, and the former Economic Policy Adviser to the Director-Gen-
eral of the GATT (1991-93), noted that "the Asian crisis cannot be sepa-
rated from the excessive borrowings of foreign short-term capital as Asian
economies loosened up their capital account controls and enabled their
banks and firms to borrow abroad... it has become apparent that crises
attendant on capital mobility cannot be ignored."5 '
What was so striking about this case is that it was truly "the intrinsic
instability in international lending"5 2 that pushed these countries to the
abyss. Most important was a net reversal of private international capital
flows to the region of $105 billion - from a net inflow of $92.8 billion in
1996 to a net outflow of $12.1 billion in 1997. This amounts to about
eleven percent of the pre-crisis GDPs in South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and the Philippines. 5 3 This is a massive and highly destabilizing
50. SeeJagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets
and Dollars, 77 FoPMGN An'. 7 (1998).
51. Id. at 8.
52. STmvEN RADEir & JEFFREY SAcHs, Ttm EAs AsIAN FiNAN IAL CRIsis: DAGNosis,
REM mms, PPosPEcrs 4 (1998).
53. Id.
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reversal of international capital flows, and it does not appear to be related
to the workings of the real, underlying economies of the region.
The regional current account deficit peaked at 5.9 percent of GDP in
1996, which is large but not overwhelming by historical standards. If we
look at South Korea, for example, its current account deficit was three per-
cent of GDP just before the crisis, as compared to a deficit of nearly nine
percent of GDP in 1980. South Korea's foreign debt as a percent of GDP
was twenty-two percent in 1996, which is low by international standards.
The same is true for its debt service as a percentage of exports (5.4%).54
These figures varied by country. For example, the current account deficit
ranged from 3.5% of GDP for Indonesia to 8.0% for Thailand.
All of the Asian nations, however, were taking in capital flows in
excess of their current account deficits, that is, accumulating foreign
exchange reserves. They were all running domestic budget surpluses, or
balanced budgets, up to the crisis, and had relatively low inflation. In
short, there was not much in the way of fundamentals that would have
indicated a storm was brewing.
Indeed, the IMF's now well-known 1997 annual report, published after
the crisis had already begun, was optimistic for the region: "Directors wel-
comed [South] Korea's continued impressive macroeconomic perform-
ance."55 The report praised the authorities for their enviable fiscal
record.5 6 The directors also "strongly praised Thailand's remarkable eco-
nomic performance and the authorities' consistent record of sound
macroeconomic policies." 57
The IMF was not the only party that was taken by surprise. Many
foreign lenders failed to perceive the trouble when interest rate spreads on
Asian bonds continued to decline in Southeast Asia between mid-1995 and
mid-1997. Investor rating services, such as Moody's and Standard and
Poor's, did not drop their ratings until after the onset of the crisis.58 Krug-
man has argued that investors may have perceived the increase in risk but
expected to be bailed out. However, as Radelet and Sachs have shown, this
seems extremely unlikely.5 9 Although the larger foreign banks were even-
tually bailed out as part of the IMF agreements with these countries, there
were many billions of dollars lent by other institutions that could not
expect, and in fact did not receive, any government guarantees.
Other explanations for the crisis, such as the media sound bites about
"crony capitalism" or "inefficient" industrial organization, have little evi-
dentiary support. Indeed, when people, including some economists, refer
to the Korean economic system as "inefficient," it is not clear what they
mean. The most obvious economic meaning would be that resources were
54. Ha-Joon Chang, Interpreting the Korean Crisis: Financial Liberalisation, Indus-
trial Policy, and Corporate Governance, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 7 (1998).
55. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT, 1997, at 59.
56. Id. at 60.
57. Jeffrey Sachs, Power Unto Itself, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 21.
58. See RADELEr & SACHS, supra note 52.
59. Id.
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allocated inefficiently, such that the economy, and therefore living stan-
dards, did not grow in accordance with its full potential. The South Korean
economy grew at a per annum rate of 7.2% over the last thirty years, one of
the highest rates of economic growth in the history of the world. It is cer-
tainly possible that it could have grown even faster and have been more
"efficient," but no one has presented an economic argument as to how this
might have been accomplished.
In such cases, the real meaning of the word "inefficiency" appears to
mean "they don't do things the way we would like them to." For example,
as part of South Korea's bailout packages, the IMF demanded that compa-
nies engage in mass layoffs. This requirement could well provoke a polit-
ical crisis in South Korea, a country in which big companies have
traditionally provided steady employment and have no social safety net for
the unemployed. The IMF argues that mass layoffs will make the Korean
economy more "efficient." But it is not clear that throwing people out on
the street is any more efficient than re-employing them elsewhere within a
large firm or conglomerate, as has been done in the past.
Some explanations for the crisis focus on the weaknesses in the Asian
economies that had been accumulating in the 1990s. Much has been made
of the "speculative bubbles" in real estate markets. Although there was
some increase in the portion of domestic lending that went to real estate
loans, it is difficult to say how much. Official data underestimates the true
amount because loans are not always used for their stated purposes. Offi-
cial data for Indonesia showed a sharp rise in real estate lending from
1990 to 1996, but data for the other countries do not. Nor do real estate
prices show the kind of dramatic run-up that would indicate a "speculative
bubble." In Indonesia, despite the increase in real estate loans, real estate
prices actually declined from 1991 to the eve of the crisis.60
That said, however, there were some problems accumulating in these
five Asian countries in the 1990s. There was a buildup in domestic bank
lending in all of the countries except Indonesia. Indonesian firms were
borrowing directly from foreign banks. As large international capital flows
poured in, real exchange rates did appreciate noticeably - about twelve
percent for South Korea and twenty-five percent for the other four coun-
tries. But other countries have had much larger real appreciations without
suffering a collapse in the value of their currencies. And it should be
stressed that these weaknesses, as well as the current account deficits, were
very much tied to the liberalization of capital flows that took place in the
preceding years.
Radelet and Sachs have also examined the effect of international
shocks,6 1 such as the devaluation of the Chinese yuan in 1994, the
increased competition from Mexico, and the overcapacity in certain indus-
tries such as semiconductors. The combined effect of these influences
does not appear to account for what happened. It is therefore difficult to
60. Id. tbls. 8-9.
61. Id.
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escape the conclusion that international financial liberalization bears the
primary responsibility for causing -the crisis.
The reversal of capital flows, which amounted to eleven percent of the
regional GDP, was a result of "herd" behavior: foreign and domestic inves-
tors alike were stampeding for the exits, lest they get caught holding greatly
depreciated local currency and assets. The cause of the panic is fairly
straightforward; the Asian crisis began with the fall of the Thai currency
(the baht) and soon spread to other countries. With a high level of short-
term international debt, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases
the cost of debf service. Everyone then needs more domestic currency to
get the same amount of dollars for debt service. The selling of domestic
currency to get those dollars, or other "hard" currencies, further drives
down the domestic currency. It does not take much to set off a panic,
especially if the central bank does not have a high level of foreign currency
reserves relative to the short-term debt. These reserves shrink further as
more and more investors convert their domestic currency and domestic
assets into dollars. To exacerbate the problem, foreign lenders often refuse
to renew the short-term loans, thereby causing the downward spiral to
continue.
Some economists believed that the inherent instability of international
financial markets was a major cause of previous financial crises, including
the Mexican crisis in 1994.62 Radelet and Sachs's statistical analysis of
recent crises in emerging markets indicated that the most important pre-
dictor of crisis was the ratio of short-term international debt to the coun-
try's foreign exchange reserves. 63 In other words, these countries became
vulnerable to panic-induced capital outflows, as well as runs on their cur-
rency, because of a buildup of short-term international borrowing.
This build-up of short-term international borrowing was a direct result
of the financial - and especially capital account - liberalization that took
place in the years preceding the crisis. In South Korea, for example, this
liberalization included the removal of a number of restrictions on foreign
ownership of domestic stocks and bonds, ownership of foreign assets, and
overseas borrowing by domestic financial and non-financial institutions.64
South Korea's foreign debt nearly tripled from $44 billion in 1993 to $120
billion in September 1997. Although this was not a very large debt burden
for an economy of South Korea's size, the short-term percentage was dan-
gerously high at 67.9% by mid-1997.65 For comparison, the average ratio
of short-term to total debt for less developed non-OPEC countries at the
time of the 1980s debt crisis (1980-82) was twenty percent.66
62. See, e.g., Guillermo A. Calvo & Enrique G. Mendoza, Reflections on Mexico's Bal-
ance of Payments Crisis: A Chronicle of a Death Foretold, 41 J. Iwr'L ECON. 235 (1995).
63. The authors used a probit model based on data for 22 emerging markets during
the years 1994-97.
64. See Chang, supra note 54.
65. RADELET & SACHS, supra note 52.
66. Chang, supra note 54.
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Financial liberalizations in other Asian countries led to similar vulner-
abilities. Thailand created the Bangkok International Banking Facility in
1992, which greatly expanded both the number and scope of financial
institutions that could borrow and lend in international markets. Indone-
sian non-financial corporations borrowed directly from foreign capital mar-
kets, piling up $39.7 billion of short-term debt by mid-1997, eighty-seven
percent of which was short-term. 67 On the eve of the crisis, the five Asian
countries had a combined foreign debt of $274 billion, sixty-four percent
of which was in short-term obligations.
The ratio of short-term debt to foreign currency reserves varied from
0.6 in Indonesia to 2.0 in South Korea. Economists who believe in the
"efficient market hypothesis"68 (i.e., that investors take into account all rel-
evant information affecting asset returns when deciding their market posi-
tions) would be hard pressed to explain the disinvestment from these
countries. Once begun, this disinvestment proceeded without regard to
country-specific economic or even financial conditions. The spread of
such disinvestment to countries that are not even remotely related to the
crisis should be reason enough to question whether deregulation of inter-
national capital flows is in the best interest of emerging market economies.
It is often assumed that liberalization is the antithesis of "crony capi-
talism" and that efforts by Western institutions, such as the IMF, to reduce
the role of government in the economy can lessen corruption and ineffi-
ciency. Ironically, it appears that South Korea's liberalization in the last
five years has had the opposite effect. According to Chang, Park, and Yoo,
the sharp reduction in government planning, especially in industrial pol-
icy, has contributed to overcapacity in the petrochemical industry, as well
as overinvestment and corporate failures in other industries such as semi-
conductors, steel, and auto. 69 The collapse of the multi-billion dollar
Hanbo conglomerate in a failed steel venture, as well as Samsung's destabi-
lizing foray into the auto industry, are examples of the dangers of aban-
doning industrial policy in a manufacturing system that was based on a
high level of coordination of investment. Ironically, even more striking is
the new form of corruption, "crony capitalism," involved in these ventures,
as particular chaebol (i.e., conglomerates) were able to leverage their influ-
ence with the government in ways that were not possible prior to the
liberalization.
B. Globalizing Institutions: Making the Worst of a Bad Situation
The greatest tragedy of the Asian crisis is not the financial panic brought
on by destabilizing capital flows, but its aftermath. Although the financial
crisis was itself serious, there was no reason for it to have resulted in the
terrible loss of income that has now spread across the region. Analysts are
67. RADELET & SACHS, supra note 52.
68. For a critique of this theory, with particular attention to the type of financial
liberalization discussed here, see DAVID FELIX, WASHINGTON UNIV. EcoN. DEPT., GLOBALz-
ING FINANCIAL CAPITAL MOBILITY: THE EMPmE'S NEw CLOTHES? (1998).
69. Chang, supra note 54.
Cornell International Law Journal
comparing the situation to our own Great Depression, given the tens of
millions of people who are being thrown into poverty. Years of economic
and social progress are being negated, as the unemployed vie for jobs in
sweatshops that they would have previously rejected, and the rural poor
subsist on leaves, bark, and insects. Women have been particularly hard
hit. They are first to be laid off and have taken sharper cuts in access to
food and other necessities. Meanwhile, girls are being pulled from school
to help with their families' survival.70
The depression did not have to happen. The crisis did not result from
problems with the underlying real economy; rather it resulted from a
liquidity problem in the financial sphere. The problem, as we have seen,
was that investors began to panic when the Thai baht started to slide in July
1997. To head off the currency and financial collapses that ensued, all that
was needed was a loan of international reserves, so that investors could be
assured that they did not have to sell today in order to avoid taking an
exchange rate loss the next day. The short-term debt could then have been
rolled over into long-term debt, thereby restoring stability. This solution
was recognized, for example, by the largest foreign banks that had made
loans to South Korea. They issued a statement last December saying that
they "shared the view that the Korean economy is strong and that the pres-
ent situation is due to a liquidity squeeze primarily caused by an excessive
reliance on short-term debt."71
By analogy, we could compare the situation with our own savings and
loan crisis a decade ago. In that case, the underlying financial weaknesses
were quite serious - about $220 billion in bad loans. The government,
however, was able to bail out the banking system, restructure those institu-
tions that could be saved, and sell off the assets of others, all without caus-
ing any loss of output in the real economy.
Instead of following the U.S. solution to its banking crisis, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund had its own plans for Asia. These plans had the
strong backing of the U.S. government, which has the dominant voice
within the IMF. Like most bad policies, theirs was a mixture of ideology
and bad intent. The latter was expressed most brazenly by former U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor when he said "that the troubles of the
tiger economies offered a golden opportunity for the West to reassert its
commercial interests. When countries seek help from the IMF, Europe and
America should use the IMF as a battering ram to gain advantage."7 2 This
they did. Billions of dollars of assets in these countries are still being
scooped up by foreigners at fire sale prices, thanks to both the underval-
ued currencies and the regional depression. Among the conditions that the
70. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Asia Feels Strain Most at Society's Margins, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 8, 1998, at Al; Nicholas D. Kristof, With Asia's Economies Shrinking, Women Are
Being Squeezed Out, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1998, at A12.
71. Timothy O'Brien, Leaders to Allow Koreans to Delay Debt Repayments, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1997, at Al.
72. Fund Managers in a Surrey State, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 5, 1997, at 31.
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IMF attached to the bailout were numerous provisions making it easier for
foreign investors to buy up local financial and non-financial enterprises.
But the ideologically driven component of the IMF's plan was much
more damaging than the policies that were tailored to Western commercial
interests. Like a medieval doctor whose first recourse is to drain the "bad
blood" from the patient, the Fund prescribed its ususal medicine: high
interest rates and a tightening of domestic credit to slow economic growth;
fiscal tightening, including cuts in food and energy subsidies in Indonesia,
were later rescinded after rioting broke out; and further liberalization of
international capital flows, notwithstanding the fact that this is what got
these countries into trouble originally. For example, South Korea was
required to abolish nearly all of its remaining restrictions on capital flows,
including those relating to the domestic financial services market and for-
eign exchange controls.73
The IMF's power should not be underestimated. Countries suffering
from balance of payments problems are generally required to get the IMF's
seal of approval before they can obtain credit from other financial institu-
tions, both public and private.74 After the IMF's mishandling of the Asian
financial crisis, its power has come under challenge. As Jeffrey Sachs has
noted: "it defies logic to believe that the small group of 1000 economists
on 19th Street in Washington should dictate the economic conditions of
life to seventy-five developing countries with around 1.4 billion people."75
It should also be noted that, at a meeting of regional finance ministers
in September 1997, Japan proposed that an "Asian Monetary Fund" be cre-
ated to provide liquidity to the faltering economies faster, and with fewer of
the conditions imposed by the IMF. This fund was to have been endowed
with as much as $100 billion in emergency resources, which would come
not only from Japan, but also from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and other countries. After strenuous opposition from the U.S. Treasury
Department, which insisted that the IMF must determine the conditions of
any bailout before any other funds were committed, the plan was dropped
by November 1997. It is impossible to tell how things might have turned
out differently, but it is certainly conceivable that the depression, and even
the worst of the currency collapses, could have been avoided if the Asian
73. See Yung Chul Park, Gradual Approach Capital Account Liberalization: The
Korean Experience (Mar. 9, 1998) (unpublished paper presented for IMF Seminar, on
file with author).
74. The IMF is correctly perceived in most of the world as a proxy for the U.S. gov-
ernment. Although Europe and Japan could outvote the United States if they wanted to
(voting rights are proportional to contributions), they have never chosen to do so. The
executive board operates by consensus; there have been 12 votes in the last 2000 deci-
sions. Testimony to the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., General Oversight Sub-
committee, 105th Cong. (Apr. 21, 1998) (testimony of Karin Lissakers, U.S. Executive
Director, International Monetary Fund). Even when the Clinton Administration asked
the IMF for an unprecedented $20 billion loan to Mexico during the peso crisis in 1995,
on extremely short notice, the European representatives expressed their disagreement
only by abstaining. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Western Allies Rebuff Clinton in Mexico, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1995, at Al.
75. Jeffrey D. Sachs, At Risk in Korea, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 21.
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Monetary Fund had been assembled and deployed at that time.76
The IMF has been imposing similar conditions around the world for
decades, and it has often been criticized for causing recessions and worsen-
ing poverty, unemployment, and income distribution with its "structural
adjustment" programs. 77 However, its intervention in the Asian economic
crisis drew more fire than any other action in its fifty-three year history in
spite of the fact that the conditions the Fund imposed upon the Asian
nations were very much in line with past practices. In a unique breach of
protocol, Joseph Stiglitz, the chief economist at the IMF's sister organiza-
tion, the World Bank, publicly criticized the Fund's policies: "These are
crises in confidence," he said.78 "You don't want to push these countries
into severe recession. One ought to focus... on things that caused the
crisis, not on things that make it more difficult to deal with."79 One reason
for the criticism is that the ideological underpinnings of the IMF's policies,
which are normally presented as purely technical measures to stabilize the
macro economy or improve efficiency, were more exposed in this case.
Countries that need the IMF's intervention tend to have chronic or struc-
tural problems either with central government budget deficits or with inter-
national balance of payments. With these countries, it is easier to support
the austerity measures that the IMF generally imposes, including the
"structural adjustment" programs. The Asian nations, however, enjoyed
balanced budgets, low inflation, and high national savings rates. In addi-
tion, their current account deficits, as noted above, provide little justifica-
tion for the conditions attached to the bailout.
Although many of these bailout conditions remain secret, those that
were publicized illustrate the destructive nature of the IMF's policies. For
example, at a time when the South Korean won depreciated by eighty per-
cent, the IMF imposed an inflation target of 5.2% for South Korea for 1998
in comparison to a rate of 4.2% the previous year.80 To hold inflation to
such a small percentage increase, with the cost of imports soaring due to
the currency depreciation, would require a recession, and perhaps even a
depression.
The IMF has made other serious mistakes that have worsened the
Asian crisis. In an internal IMF memo that was leaked to the press, one of
the IMF's acts was admitted to be an error. This act involved the closing of
sixteen Indonesian banks, a move that the IMF thought would help restore
confidence in the nation's banking system. Instead, the closings led to
panic withdrawals by depositors, thereby further destabilizing the financial
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system.8 1
The IMF also failed to arrange a roll-over of the short-term foreign debt
owed by Indonesian non-financial firms, thereby rendering Indonesia
unable to stabilize its currency and leaving firms unable to obtain the nec-
essary credits for essential imports and even exports. The Indonesian cur-
rency took its deepest plunge just days after the second IMF agreement was
signed on January 15, 1998.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that the IMF failed to restore market
confidence in the region. The IMF was negotiating for recessionary condi-
tions with the affected countries. Even worse, the IMF was fighting for
structural "reforms." The IMF argued that the crisis was due to "funda-
mental structural weaknesses"8 2 in the affected economies, rather than the
easily solvable liquidity problem that, in actuality, caused the crisis. This
is certainly not a recipe for inducing investors to return. The amount of
funds actually dispersed was much smaller than the amount of funds com-
mitted. This amount was probably not enough for the IMF to function as
the lender of last resort as was needed. In Indonesia, for example, there
was only $3 billion in disbursements as compared to a $40 billion commit-
ment by March 1998.83
Conclusion
It has long been recognized that a system of unregulated markets does not
regulate itself, is prone to crises and depressions, and does not necessarily
allow the majority of its participants to share in the gains from economic
growth and technological progress. Proponents of global financial liberali-
zation, however, failed to heed this warning and chose to act in contraven-
tion to the economic history of the past two centuries. This Article argues
that globalization represents capitalization in denial: it is a back-door way
of re-introducing the worst excesses and irrationalities into healthy
markets.
There is no global equivalent of the nation-state that can engage in
expansionary fiscal policy to combat a regional or even global recession.
Not even the automatic stabilizers that are built into the national budgets
of the developed countries can combat such economic woes. There is no
international central bank to use monetary policy to serve similar stabiliza-
tion purposes. There is no global welfare state to provide a safety net for
the hardest-hit victims of market forces. There is no global equivalent of
national labor legislation to protect the rights of workers to organize and
bargain collectively. There is no international environmental legislation,
nor would there be a means of enforcing such legislation if it existed.
The global economy is, therefore, the last refuge for those who would
prefer to avoid these encumbrances, including the transnational corpora-
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tions, who have the dominant voice in reshaping the world economic order
in the present era. The transnational institutions of the global economy -
the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT, the WTO, and the proposed MAI -
are often viewed as quasi-state institutions, especially by reformers who see
in them the potential for performing globally those rationalizing functions
that nations have traditionally performed at the individual-state level. But
in fact, these transnational institutions resemble the nation-state only in its
most repressive aspects. They reinforce and exacerbate the existing distri-
bution of wealth and power, as well as the international division of labor
between rich and poor nations.
There is also a more irrational side to these institutions. Since the
1980s, as the ideology of neo-liberalism8 4 has increasingly taken on a life
of its own, globalization is irrationally pursued as an end unto itself. The
country specifics vary widely, but the overriding principle seems to be the
subordination of the national economy to the vicissitudes of international
markets. The tail wags the dog and hobbles it, too. In Russia, for example,
the stability and convertibility of the ruble was given top priority at the
behest of foreign investors, especially those concerned with portfolio
investment. In August of 1998, the IMF loaned Russia $4.8 billion, part of
a $22 billion dollar package, to stabilize the ruble. This money went right
into the outstretched hands of speculators. In September, the ruble col-
lapsed and Russia defaulted on both its domestic and foreign debts.
The collapse of the ruble and Russia's default have had profound
implications far beyond Russia's borders. These effects have highlighted
yet another spectacular failure of the IMF, coming not only on the heels of
the Asian financial crisis, but also after six years of IMF intervention in
Russia. The Russian people have paid a terrible price for their adherence to
the IMF's neoliberal prescriptions, which advised that Russia's manufactur-
ing and industrial base be scrapped - because they were not "internation-
ally competitive" - and rebuilt using foreign investment. The first part of
the formula has been applied. Russia now produces hardly anything but
energy. However, it is now clear that the anticipated foreign investment
will not be forthcoming. Meanwhile, in the last six years, the average Rus-
sian household has lost more than half of its income, a decline greater than
that which occurred during America's Great Depression. The majority of
Russians have fallen below the poverty line. The decline in male life expec-
tancy, from a pre-"reform" 65.5 years to 57 years, is historically unprece-
dented in the absence of a war or a major natural disaster. The odds that
Russia will opt for a path divergent from the IMF's "reform" program of the
last six years are now considerable and increasing.
The final disintegration of the Russian "reform" model sent shock
waves through the international financial system, highlighting the instabil-
ity of globalized capital markets. As this paper goes to print, Brazil has
been forced to raise interest rates to fifty percent and has spent more than a
billion dollars a day over the last month to support its exchange rate; Mex-
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ico pushed interest rates to forty percent; and Latin America teeters on the
edge of financial collapse. Even if the dreaded implosion can be avoided,
the economic and social costs will be steep. Amazingly, all of this turmoil
was caused by a financial meltdown in Russia, an economy with which
Latin American countries have minimal commercial relations. The irra-
tionality of international financial markets has reached new extremes, as
one poor country after another is trampled by the herd behavior of
investors.
Meanwhile, the fallout from globalization continues to drift back to
the United States, most recently in the form of record trade deficits ($15.7
billion for May 1998) that followed in the wake of the Asian crisis. An
estimated 700,000 jobs will be displaced in the United States.85 It is diffi-
cult to see why the IMF, and by extension our own government, has not
been accorded its rightful share of the blame. By unnecessarily forcing the
Asian economies into depression and leaving them no way to grow except
through exports based on undervalued currencies, the IMF has greatly
worsened the impact of the crisis on the U.S. economy.
As the evidence of globalization's harmful effects continues to mount,
the debate within the United States will undoubtedly intensify. A shift in
the burden of proof seems long overdue. The logic of "downward harmoni-
zation," as unfettered global market forces push both environmental and
living standards toward the lowest common denominator, is straightfor-
ward. The instability and irrationality of global deregulation is becoming
more obvious with the occurrence of each crisis.
Until recently, those who have claimed that the majority of citizens
benefit from continually increased trade and investment liberalization have
not had to defend their claim. They have not had to explain, for example,
how international agreements that contain an array of new protections and
privileges for transnational corporations, but not for the environment or
labor, are in everyone's best interest. They have only had to dismiss their
opponents as protectionists, demagogues, atavists, or xenophobes. More
recently, a group of economists diagnosed this opposition as suffering
from "globaphobia,"8 6 an apparently irrational fear of the global economy.
Those days may be nearing an end, and the globalizers may soon have
to make their case on the merits. Let the debate begin.
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